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In this dissertation I examine how political frictions affect borrowing decisions of the govern-
ments and I discuss whether these frictions are quantitatively relevant in the data. The thesis is
composed of two chapters. In the first chapter we show that the interaction between political fric-
tions and strategical political incentives to borrow is a key factor in explaining the cross-sectional
differences in debt levels when debt repayment is enforceable. In the second chapter I introduce
political uncertainty in the standard default model of Arellano (2008) and I show that in the cal-
ibrated version of the model to the Argentinian economy the model generates realistic levels of
debt to gdp and spread without affecting the performance on the other business cycle statistics.
Chapter 1: Strategic Debt and Political Frictions in Small
Open Economies
In this chapter we provide evidence, both theoretical and empirical, that the interaction between
political frictions and strategical political incentives to borrow is a key factor in explaining the
cross-sectional differences in debt levels. Our contribution is both theoretical and empirical. From
a theoretical point of view, we analyze what are the main political determinants of borrowing
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incentives. We show that for a large class of utility functions, political uncertainty per-se does not
create borrowing incentives. However, the introduction of retrospective voting, which assumes that
electoral outcomes are dependent upon recent economic performances, can revert that result, thus
creating borrowing incentives. From an empirical point of view, we confirm our theoretical results
by analzying a cross-country dataset on debt, economic performances, and quality of governments.
We use the predictions of our model to structurally estimate the unobserved degree of retrospective
voting for 56 developing economies. We show that this feature, jointly with observable measure of
political frictions, can explain a substantial fraction of the cross-sectional dispersion of the debt-to-
GDP ratio that is unexplained by other macroeconomic factors. Finally, we find that the estimated
measures of retrospective voting are strongly linked to indices of corruption. This finding can be
related to the theoretical work of Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990), where retrospective
voting arises because politicians might have undesirable and unobserved characteristics.
Our theoretical result strongly depends on how political frictions are modelled. In Amador
and Aguiar (2011) the benefit from being in power for an incumbent comes directly from her
preferences and it is independent from the allocation of resources. In Alesina and Tabellini (1990a)
two opposing parties aim to invest in two different public goods. In our model, similarly to Alesina
and Tabellini (1990b), parties have preferences over distribution across different groups and decide
the allocation of consumption according to these preferences. A single parameter, which we refer
to as the degree of political frictions, determines how unequally the incumbent would like to split
aggregate resources. As long as preferences are far from the case of zero inequality, the benefits
from being in power are larger. We believe that the assumption on political frictions operating
through redistribution of resources is realistic, in particular when considering emerging markets.
We include political frictions described above in a standard small open-economy setting: an
incumbent makes intertemporal consumption/saving decisions by borrowing or saving at a fixed
international interest rate. Our first result is that when political uncertainty is characterized by a
constant probability to be reelected, political frictions per-se are not necessarily able to produce
borrowing incentives. For example, when the incumbent has Constant Relative Risk Aversion
(CRRA) preferences with risk aversion coefficient greater than one, political uncertainty and po-
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litical frictions induce precautionary savings. In fact, under this preferences, the incumbent would
like to transfer resources from her incumbent-state to a possible future opposition-state, thus lead-
ing to incentives to postpone consumption. This finding appears to contradict the generally stated
result in the literature (see Alesina and Tabellini (1990b) that political frictions generate borrow-
ing incentives because an incumbent, when in office, prefers to spend since political uncertainty
does not guarantee that in the next period resources will be allocated according to her preferences.
We point out that this result is valid, but only under certain values of the preference parameters
(in the specific case of CRRA utility, it holds only when the degree of risk aversion is less than
one). Since the microeconomics, macroeconomics, and finance literature all support estimates of
the CRRA risk aversion coefficient greater than one (or equivalently of an intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution less than one), one goal of this paper is to introduce a new channel through
which political frictions induce borrowing incentives also for less restrictive and more plausible
assumptions about the properties of the utility function.
Then, as a second contribution, we introduce retrospective voting in our political economy
framework. Specifically, we generalize the model described above assuming, in a reduced form,
that an incumbent has a larger probability of being reelected if the population observes large
consumption levels. Since in our model utility depends solely on consumption, higher aggregate
consumption level improves the chances of an incumbent to retain office1. Empirical studies, such
as Pacek and Radcliff (1995), Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000), and Bartels (2013), support the
notion that economic performance is a crucial determinant of electoral outcomes and political
approval. Theoretically, retrospective voting has been first introduced by Nordhaus (1975) where
voters myopically reappoint the incumbent conditionally on current economic conditions. Rogoff
and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) rationalized this behaviour in a rational expectation model
by means of a multidimensional signalling game.
As a third contribution, we use the theoretical predictions of our model to estimate the un-
observable degree of retrospective voting. Recall the two main theoretical findings: first, without
retrospective voting, stronger political frictions lead to larger saving incentives; second, when the
1In our setting retrospective voting exists without rationalizing it formally, but the model could be extended by
endogeneizing the voting behaviour.
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degree of retrospective voting is instead high, stronger political frictions lead to larger borrowing
incentives. These predictions act as identification assumptions on the country-specific degree of
retrospective voting, when political frictions and debt levels are observed. Hence, in the empirical
part of the paper, we structurally estimate the degree of retrospective voting for each country. We
gather data about economic variables and quality of institutions for the period 1989-2010 for 56
emerging and transition economies. For each country, we measure the degree of political friction
with an index that combines the degree of ethnic fractionalization and a measure of inequality.
We show that our estimates can explain a significant portion of debt levels. Finally, we relate the
estimated measures of degree of retrospective voting to corruption indices. The strong relationship
between our estimates and observable corruption measures is striking and robust to many different
specifications of the model. The rationale behind this link steams from the idea developed in Shi
and Svensson (2006): when governments might have unobservable, and potentially undesirable,
characteristics, voters must rely simply on economic conditions as a possible signal about the qual-
ity of the government. According to this theory, then, it should be the case that the larger is the
uncertainty about the type of the government, the stronger is the degree of retrospective voting.
Finally, we validate our theory showing that indeed corruption indices explain a large part of the
cross-sectional debt heterogeneity only when they interact with obsserved measures of political
frictions, in line with our theory.
Chapter 2: Political Cost of Default and Business Cycle in
Emerging Countries
Some stylized facts about business cycle and sovereign defaults in emerging economies have been es-
tablished by the literature, but some of these facts have not been considered in quantitative models.
The first fact is that there is limited support for theories that explains the feasibility of sovereign
debt based on external sanctions or exclusion from international markets (as in Arellano (2008))
and more support for internal factors. Secondly, there is growing agreement that default events in
many emerging economies have been triggered by political motives (Balkan (1992), Panizza et al.
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(2009), Hatchondo et al. (2009), Hatchondo and Martinez (2010) , Cuadra and Sapriza (2008)).
In this paper we present a quantitative model of default with political uncertainty that accounts
for these facts, that closely match relevant business cycle statistics and the level of debt to gdp,
default likelihood and spread that we observe in the data.
Regarding external sanctions, many empirical papers focus on evaluating the cost of default
for a country. According to Gelos et al. (2008), that defined market access from bond issuance,
exclusion from capital markets lasted 4 years on average after default event during the 80’s, but this
duration drops to 0.3 years during the 90’s. Richmond and Dias (2009) measured market access as
positive next transfers. In this way they measured that it took 5.5 years on average to exit from
default during the 80’s, 4.1 during the 90’s and 2.5 years after 2000. This results show that relying
on market exclusion to explain political cost of default is not a realistic representation of reality. In
Arellano (2008) calibration, exclusion from capital markets lasts 2.5 years on average after default.
Mendoza and Yue (2012) calibrate re-entry probability according to the estimates of Richmond
and Dias (2009), implying 10 years of exclusion from capital markets on average. Exclusion from
capital markets is costly for the government because of the inability to smooth consumption, but
according to Lucas (1987), Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Otrok (2001) welfare cost of business
cycle is relatively small. In addition traditional models of sovereign defaults assume that output
drops in default periods, but they do not deal with the simultaneity issue that defaults occur more
likely during recessions.
Instead there seems to be more support for a political explanation of the default. Politicians in
several economies seem to postpone for a long time unavoidable defaults. On possible explanation
for this is that they want to avoid to be replaced in office. By looking at post-election results,
there seems to be clear evidence that after a default the incumbent loses political support. There is
not a large body of literature on estimating the political cost of default. Borensztein and Panizza
(2009) calculated the loss in the vote share for the ruling part after a default; across countries
the incumbent losts on average 16% of electoral supports. There is much more evidence on the
political cost of currency devaluation. Cooper (1971) and was the first to illustrate the political
cost of devaluations by showing that devaluations more than double (from 14 to 30 percent) the
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probability of a political crisis and a government change within the next 12 months. Frankel
(2005) updated the results of Cooper (1971) and found that in the 1971 - 2003 period devaluations
increased the probability of a change in the chief of the executive in the following 12 months from
20 to 29 percent. In this paper we do not provide an explanation for why voters are more likely
to substitute the incumbent in case of default and in some specific cases it could also be that the
incumbent does not face this risk (See Greek elections in 2015). But this argument finds sufficient
support for Argentinian default of 2001.
In this paper we present a model of sovereign default with political uncertainty. The agent has
an exogenous probability of being replaced in the following period after default decision is taken.
In case of default this probability rises, making default more costly from a political point of view
since the incumbent can ‘’fall” in the opposition state where she benefits of lower intertemporal
utility. The existence of political uncertainty per se produces borrowing incentive as in the political
economy literature (Alesina and Tabellini (1990a), Amador (2004), Amador and Aguiar (2011)).
Nevertheless previous papers have not considered the enforceability of debt contracts: even if ex-
ante the government has an incentive to raise more debt it does not imply repayment ex-post.
The existence of larger political uncertainty associated to default events improves the incentive to
repay by producing larger debt levels in equilibrium. The model is calibrated to Argentina, where
I show that the model can fairly well match debt levels observed in reality, in contrast with the
inability of previous papers on this dimension. This paper is closely related to Amador (2004)
that shows that because of political uncertainty that generates borrowing incentive the replication
strategy that is central in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) is not efficient. As a result we can also observe
positive amount of debt without default. In this paper we focus on the quantitative implication of
political uncertainty and we argue that political uncertainty in ‘’normal” times is not sufficient to
reproduce the large level of debt observed in the data.
References
Aguiar, M. and G. Gopinath (2007): “Emerging Market Business Cycles: The Cycle Is the
Trend,” Journal of Political Economy, 115, 69–102.
6
Alesina, A. and G. Tabellini (1990a): “A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government
Debt,” Review of Economic Studies, 57, 403–14.
——— (1990b): “Voting on the Budget Deficit,” The American Economic Review, 80, 37–49.
Amador, M. (2004): “A Political Model Sovereign Debt Repayment,” 2004 Meeting Papers 762,
Society for Economic Dynamics.
Amador, M. and M. Aguiar (2011): “Growth dynamics in a small open economy under
political economy frictions,” 2011 Meeting Papers 1363, Society for Economic Dynamics.
Arellano, C. (2008): “Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies,” The
American Economic Review, 98, pp. 690–712.
Balkan, E. M. (1992): “Political instability, country risk and probability of default,” Applied
Economics, 24, 999–1008.
Bartels, L. (2013): “Ideology and Retrospection in Electoral Responses to the Great Recession,”
Mimeo.
Borensztein, E. and U. Panizza (2009): “The Costs of Sovereign Default,” IMF Staff Papers,
56, 683–741.
Bulow, J. and K. Rogoff (1989): “Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?” The American
Economic Review, 79, pp. 43–50.
Cooper, R. N. (1971): “Currency devaluation in developing countries,” .
Cuadra, G. and H. Sapriza (2008): “Sovereign default, interest rates and political uncertainty
in emerging markets,” Journal of International Economics, 76, 78–88.
Frankel, J. A. (2005): “Contractionary currency crashes in developing countries,” Tech. rep.,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
7
Gelos, R. G., R. Sahay, and G. Sandleris (2008): “Sovereign Borrowing by Developing
Countries: What Determines Market Access?” Business School Working Paper 2008-02, Uni-
versidad Torcuato Di Tella.
Hatchondo, J. C. and L. Martinez (2010): “The politics of sovereign defaults,” FRB Rich-
mond Economic Quarterly, 96, 291–317.
Hatchondo, J. C., L. Martinez, and H. Sapriza (2009): “Heterogeneous borrowers in
quantitative models of sovereign default*,” International Economic Review, 50, 1129–1151.
Lewis-Beck, M. S. and M. Stegmaier (2000): “Economic determinants of electoral out-
comes,” Political Science, 3, 183.
Lucas, R. E. (1987): “Models of Business Cycles Basil Blackwell,” New York.
Mendoza, E. G. and V. Z. Yue (2012): “A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default
and Business Cycles,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(2), 889–946.
Nordhaus, W. D. (1975): “The political business cycle,” The Review of Economic Studies, 42,
169–190.
Otrok, C. (2001): “On measuring the welfare cost of business cycles,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 47, 61–92.
Pacek, A. C. and B. Radcliff (1995): “Economic Voting and the Welfare State: A Cross-
National Analysis,” The Journal of Politics, 57, 44–61.
Panizza, U., F. Sturzenegger, and J. Zettelmeyer (2009): “The Economics and Law of
Sovereign Debt and Default,” Journal of Economic, 47, pp. 651–698.
Richmond, C. and D. A. Dias (2009): “Duration of capital market exclusion: An empirical
investigation,” Available at SSRN 1027844.
Rogoff, K. (1990): “Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles,” American Economic Review, 80,
21–36.
8
Rogoff, K. and A. Sibert (1988): “Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles,” The Review
of Economic Studies, 55, 1–16.
Shi, M. and J. Svensson (2006): “Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and
why?” Journal of Public Economics, 90, 1367 – 1389.
9
